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Cortes v. State, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 44 (July 21, 2011) 1
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE—UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Summary
Appeal from conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell.
Disposition/Outcome
A unanimous three-judge panel affirmed because, if the finding of reasonable suspicion is
sound, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. Furthermore, the Court does not interpret
Nevada’s constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures more strictly than
the United States Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amendment.
Factual and Procedural History
Arturo Torres Cortes (“Cortes”) was a passenger in a car stopped by a patrol officer at
night for not having a license plate or temporary tag. A backup officer arrived shortly thereafter.
When asked for identification, Cortes gave conflicting answers as to whether he had ID. During
the stop, one officer noticed a tool-knife on Cortes’s lap, which she asked Cortes to place on the
floor. Officers also testified the driver and Cortes were unusually agitated during the stop.
Later, after failing to obey commands to keep his hands in his lap, an officer ordered
Cortes from the vehicle. Cortes exited the vehicle furtively. Cortes then resisted the officer’s
attempt to conduct a patdown search, so the officer handcuffed him. During the search, officers
discovered a methamphetamine pipe. Cortes continued to struggle, and was then arrested for
obstructing an officer. During the search incident to arrest that followed, the officers also
discovered 3.3 grams of methamphetamine.
Before trial, Cortes filed a motion to suppress the pipe and drug evidence as the fruits of
an illegal search and seizure. The district court denied the motion under Arizona v. Johnson. 2
The jury subsequently convicted Cortes of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
sell. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Standard of Review; Evidentiary Hearings
The Court reviews de novo the district court’s legal determination of the constitutionality
of a frisk but review its findings of fact for clear error. 3 Cortes faulted the district court for not
sua sponte ordering an evidentiary hearing. However, because Cortes did not contest the
evidence below, the Court declined to find the district court’s findings clearly erroneous or
plainly wrong.
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Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009).
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Somee v. State, 124 Nev. 434, 441, 187 P.3d 152, 157-58 (2008).
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Fourth Amendment Analysis
The Court found the district court correctly applied Arizona v. Johnson as the controlling
case. Johnson applies the two-pronged stop and frisk test in Terry v. Ohio. 4 The first prong
requires a lawful traffic stop. 5 Johnson/Terry applies to a passenger with equal force because a
passenger’s motivation “‘to employ violence to prevent apprehension’ of [a more serious] crime .
. . is every bit as great as that of the driver.’” 6 Because passengers are already stopped, the
passenger is deemed seized for Terry purposes “just as the driver is, ‘from the moment [a car
stopped by the police comes] to a halt on the side of the road.’” 7 Cortes did not contest the
lawfulness of the traffic stop. Thus, the district court properly held the first prong of
Johnson/Terry was met.
The second prong of Johnson/Terry focuses on the justification for the frisk. It asks
whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion that the driver and any passengers may be armed
and dangerous, which “is a fact-specific inquiry that looks at the totality of the circumstances in
light of common sense and practicality.” 8 Reasonable suspicion is measured by an objective
standard. 9
The Court found the totality of the circumstances in this case justified frisking Cortes to
protect the officers from the threat they reasonably suspected he posed to their safety. When
officers arrived, Cortes had a knife in his lap; the presence of a knife in plain view in a lawfully
stopped car contributes to reasonable suspicion that other weapons may be present, making the
person armed and dangerous even if the knife is moved out of reach. 10 Cortes also refused to
keep his hands in plain view, despite repeated requests. 11 Cortes gave contradictory answers
about whether he had identification; “evasive responses to police questions can help support
reasonable suspicion,” as can “contradictory answers to simple questions.” 12 Nervousness and
agitation also support reasonable suspicion. 13 Finally, when Cortes exited the vehicle, he did so
strangely, trying to conceal his hands and back from officers. 14 Given all of this, the Court
found common sense indicated a reasonable officer confronting Cortes at night during a traffic
stop could reasonably suspect Cortes was armed and that a frisk was necessary to protect himself
and his partner.
Seatbelt Law’s Alleged Unconstitutional Vagueness as Basis for Exclusion of Evidence
Cortes further argued that Nevada’s seatbelt statute, NRS 484D.495, is unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad if it allows an officer to cite a passenger for a violation after the car is
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stopped when the officer did not observe the violation while the vehicle was moving. According
to Cortes, if NRS 484D.495 is unconstitutional in that respect, then the officer’s request for
identification pursuant to NRS 484A.730(1) constituted an illegal search, making everything that
followed the fruit of that poisonous tree. The Court rejected that argument for several reasons.
First, the Court was not troubled with the constitutionality of the seatbelt statute as applied to
Cortes. Second, evidence seized in reliance on a statute later held unconstitutionally vague does
not violate the Fourth Amendment or require suppression of the evidence. 15 Finally, a request
for identification does not constitute an additional seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 16
Nevada’s Equivalent to the Fourth Amendment
Article I, section 18 of the Nevada Constitution uses almost the same words as the Fourth
Amendment does to prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. 17 Cortes argued the Court
should, as a matter of policy, read the Nevada Constitution as imposing a stricter test for trafficstop frisks than Arizona v. Johnson does. Although federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
does not dictate how a state supreme court interprets cognate provisions of its state
constitution, 18 and the Court has in two instances imposed stricter standards under article I,
section 18 of the Nevada Constitution than the Fourth Amendment demands, 19 the Court found
no reason to adopt that divergent approach in the Arizona v. Johnson context.
The Court has already held—albeit in a Fourth Amendment context rather than under the
Nevada Constitution—that the need for officer safety in a traffic stop outweighs any intrusion,
especially where reasonable suspicion develops during the stop that the passenger may be armed
and dangerous. 20 The Court then cited to several cases where the Court has applied Terry to
search and seizure challenges. 21 The Court also rejected reliance on Harnisch and Bayard as
justification to adopt a stricter standard in this case, noting “[n]either case involved the
emergency police-safety concerns that underlie Terry.” The Court dismissed Cortes’s remaining
claims of testimonial, evidentiary, and instructional errors, finding either that the district court
did not abuse its discretion or that the objections were not properly preserved for appeal.
Conclusion
Arizona v. Johnson’s two-pronged approach to traffic stop frisks applies in Nevada. In
such cases, the article I, section 18 of the Nevada Constitution does not afford stricter protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment does.
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